Abortion is more time sensitive; the earlier it happens, the safer it is for the woman. Abortion is now a common gynaecological procedure affecting one in four women in OECD countries. Euthanasia, where permissible, is uncommon. Euthanasia is a possibility for anyone on the gender spectrum. To some, euthanasia is possibly more ethical than abortion, because the patient is competent and actually makes the request themselves whereas the life that is lost in abortion is decided by another.
Correspondence Email msparrow value. References Report of the Abortion Supervisory Committee View PDF Version. Subscriber Content The full contents of this pages only available to subscribers. This Issue. This request was denied at the domestic level. She alleged that this refusal infringed her rights under the ECHR. She focused her complaint principally on Article 3 of the Convention.
She submitted that the suffering which she faced qualified as degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention. She also alleged violation of Article 2. She alleged that permitting her to be assisted in committing suicide would not be in conflict with Article 2 of the Convention. According to the applicant, Article 2 protects not only the right to life but also the right to choose whether or not to go on living.
It was submitted that it protected the right to life and not life itself, while the sentence concerning deprivation of life was directed towards protecting individuals from third parties, namely the state and public authorities, not from themselves. The applicant claimed that Article 2 therefore acknowledged that it was for the individual to choose whether or not to go on living and protected her right to die to avoid inevitable suffering and indignity as the corollary of the right to life.
Pretty v. The United Kingdom. The applicant submitted that permitting her to be assisted in committing suicide would not be in conflict with Article 2 of the Convention, otherwise those countries in which assisted suicide was not unlawful would be in breach of this provision.
Furthermore, Article 2 protected not only the right to life but also the right to choose whether or not to go on living. It protected the right to life and not life itself, while the sentence concerning deprivation of life was directed towards protecting individuals from third parties, namely the State and public authorities, not from themselves.
Article 2 therefore acknowledged that it was for the individual to choose whether or not to go on living and protected her right to die to avoid inevitable suffering and indignity as the corollary of the right to life. In so far as the Keenan case referred to by the Government indicated that an obligation could arise for prison authorities to protect a prisoner who tried to take his own life, the obligation only arose because he was a prisoner and lacked, due to his mental illness, the capacity to take a rational decision to end his life see Keenan v.
Article 2, guaranteeing one of the most fundamental rights, imposed primarily a negative obligation. Although it had in some cases been found to impose positive obligations, this concerned steps appropriate to safeguard life. Germany , no. The wording of Article 2 expressly provided that no one should be deprived of their life intentionally, save in strictly limited circumstances which did not apply in the present case.
The right to die was not the corollary, but the antithesis of the right to life. It safeguards the right to life, without which enjoyment of any of the other rights and freedoms in the Convention is rendered nugatory. It sets out the limited circumstances when deprivation of life may be justified and the Court has applied a strict scrutiny when those exceptions have been relied on by the respondent States ibid. The text of Article 2 expressly regulates the deliberate or intended use of lethal force by State agents.
This obligation extends beyond a primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions; it may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual see Osman v.
Turkey , no. Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a rightto die; nor can it create a right to self-determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather than life. The Court accordingly finds that no right to die, whether at the hands of a third person or with the assistance of a public authority, can be derived from Article 2 of the Convention.
The Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention. Therefore, according to the Court, Article 2 ECHR does not include the individual right to choose whether or not to go on living. This case is also discussed under privacy see Interference with the Right to Privacy. The Inter-American Court has never dealt with a case relating to abortion; therefore it is interesting to include a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the basis of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
Although the Declaration was adopted as a non-binding instrument, by virtue of its relationship with the OAS Charter , the Declaration has come to be indirectly binding on all OAS member states. The Commission receives individual complaints alleging violations of the Declaration with respect to OAS member states that are not parties to theACHR , as in the case of the United States of America in the following complaint.
In , Christian B. White and Gary K. Baby boy v. The United States of America. Three controversial judgments by the European Court of Human Rights addressing the issue of access to abortion, declining in one case to affirm abortion as a human right per se Westeson Significantly, over the years, the polarity of values and views underpinning the abortion controversy has threatened to divide nations, has seen abortion clinics firebombed and abortion workers fatally shot by pro-life fanatics, and has even brought down governments Hadley Women can also face other significant barriers when seeking access to safe reproductive health services — for example, availability of services particularly for women in rural and remote areas , waiting times for an appointment, travelling distance to a clinic which can include having to travel from rural to metropolitan areas as well as interstate , abortion stigma i.
For example, a woman might decide to have an abortion based on advice received from her attending medical practitioner that her fetus is at risk of being born with severe birth defects because of a drug she has taken.
The above issues help to demonstrate the complexities of the abortion issue and the tensions involved. As shown by the examples given in the previous editions of this book, nurses historically have had to face a range of personal, political and professional difficulties on account of moral disagreements in the workplace concerning the abortion issue. To help gain a better understanding of the complexities of the issues involved, a critical examination of the ethics and politics of abortion is warranted.
It is to providing such an examination that this chapter will now turn. Instead, most lean towards definitions of abortion that, although appearing to be value-neutral objective , are in essence ethically loaded and hence at risk of misleading moral debate on the issue. It is unlikely that a consensus will be reached among contesting parties on a working definition of abortion and that various ethically loaded definitions will continue to be used. Either way, it is important to remember that the issues at hand need to be decided by careful deliberation, not by definitions; they also need to be examined in a manner that will question rather than reinforce the status quo.
Arguments for and against abortion have tended to be advanced from three distinctive positions: a conservative position, a moderate position and a liberal position.
A common concern among conservative anti-abortionists is that, if abortion is permitted, then respect for the sanctity of human life will be diminished, making it easier for human life to be taken in other circumstances. Arguments typically raised against abortion here are almost always based on the sanctity-of-life doctrine. One example of the kind of reasoning which might be employed to argue against abortion is as follows:.
Whether human beings do in fact have a natural right to life, and whether fetuses are in fact human beings, are matters of ongoing philosophical controversy. According to the moderate position see, for example, Bolton ; Werner abortion is only a prima-facie moral wrong, and thus prohibitions against it may be overridden by stronger moral considerations.
Werner , for example, argues that abortion is permissible provided that it is procured during pre-sentience i. Since a pre-sentient fetus cannot feel, it cannot be meaningfully harmed or benefited.
Thus, as with other non-sentient or pre-sentient entities, it makes no sense to say a fetus has rights, much less a right to life. In the case of post-sentience, Werner argues that abortion may still be justified on carefully defined grounds, namely: self-defence e. Abortions performed on lesser grounds are, according to Werner, unjustified.
Bolton takes a slightly different line of reasoning. She argues that, as fetuses are not undisputed persons, they do not have the same rights not to be killed as do actual undisputed persons. Bolton also argues, controversially, that if women are not permitted to have abortions, the community might find itself deprived of the beneficial contributions that a woman freed of the burdens of child rearing would otherwise be free to make p Either way, the facts of the matter need to be carefully assessed and analysed before an abortion decision is deemed justified.
Another moderate argument raised in defence of abortion is that a woman is under no moral obligation to bring a pregnancy to term, particularly in instances where the pregnancy has been forced upon her as in the case of rape , or where the pregnancy has not resulted from a voluntary and informed choice as in cases involving contraceptive failure or ignorance. This is because morality does not generally require individuals to make large sacrifices to keep another alive.
Thus, if pregnancy requires a woman to make a large sacrifice — and one which she is not willing to make — it is morally permissible for her to terminate the pregnancy. A more recent moderate argument in defence of the permissibility of abortion takes an entirely different stance. This includes recognising that, although pregnancy is one of many physical conditions a woman can experience, it does not mean it is without vice e.
By this view, a woman might choose to abort a pregnancy — not because she is selfish or irresponsible or indecent, but because her circumstances do not permit her to provide love and care to a child, or to protect a child from a life of rejection and burdensome struggle. It could be objected, however, that the kinds of sacrifices a woman might ultimately be required to make by giving birth could be avoided by her allowing the unwanted child to be adopted.
Indeed, many view the adoption option as a respectable way out of the abortion dilemma — even in cases involving severely disabled fetuses or severely disabled newborns. Thomson , however, rejects the adoption option, arguing that it can be utterly devastating on relinquishing mothers. Although social processes e. In one study, for example, researchers found that adoptees were over-represented in clinical settings for externalising disorders e. Babies conceived as a result of war rape are particularly vulnerable to being stigmatised, discriminated against, rejected, abandoned and even killed.
After the Bosnia war, for example, it was reported that the government of the day prohibited adoption of the children of rape victims, in the hope that their natural mothers would one day accept them Williams : 8.
As these examples show, the adoption option is not as straightforward as its advocates have perhaps assumed. The third stance on abortion, the liberal position see in particular Thomson ; Tooley ; Warren, , Warren, , Warren, , Warren, , Warren, , holds that abortion is morally permissible on demand.
Michael Tooley argues, for example, that as fetuses are not persons they cannot meaningfully claim a right to life.
Warren argues along similar lines. She contends that a fetus is not a human being and to claim that it is only begs the question. In other words, it is one thing to be human in the genetic sense, but it is quite another to be human in the moral sense.
These two senses are quite distinct, and care must be taken to distinguish between them. She concludes Warren : 53 : 3. The consequence of this is unavoidable. It has yet to be demonstrated that the genetic humanity of fetuses alone qualifies them to have fully fledged membership of the moral community.
Further, were this to be demonstrated convincingly, it then leaves unanswered the question of what moral status ought to be accorded human—animal chimeras — that is, other non-human species e. For example, ought a mouse or other animal into which human genes have been successfully planted see Behringer be accorded the same moral status as a human fetus at least, if not a fully fledged human being? If genetic humanity is sufficient to accord moral humanity then human—animal chimeras ought also to be accorded moral status.
Judith Jarvis Thomson also argues that a fetus is not a person. The analogy can be extended further to show that, just as stepping on an acorn is significantly different from cutting down an oak tree, so too is aborting a fetus significantly different from killing an actual person.
The conclusion of these and similar views is that, once it is admitted that a fetus is nothing more than a clump of genetically human cells, the abortion issue becomes a non-issue. The three positions on abortion discussed so far can be expressed diagrammatically as shown in Fig. Pro-abortionists, however, reject this view, arguing that, although a human fetus is genetically human, this in no way implies that it is morally a human being with a full set of rights claims. Neither, they argue, is a fetus a person.
In defence of this position, pro-abortionists contend that in order for a fetus to be a person it must satisfy the moral criteria of personhood which are very different from the criteria of fetalhood — something that a fetus simply does not do. Let us consider this claim further. The much-cited North American philosopher, Mary Anne Warren, has classically argued that, for an entity to be a person, it must satisfy a number of criteria, namely:.
Warren admitted that there were numerous difficulties involved in formulating and applying precise criteria of personhood.
Even so, it could be done. Commenting on the criteria she had formulated, Warren argued that an entity does not need to have all five attributes described, and that it is possible that attributes given in criteria 1 and 2 alone are sufficient for personhood, and might even qualify as necessary criteria for personhood. Given these criteria, all that needs to be claimed to demonstrate that an entity including a fetus is not a person is that any entity which fails to satisfy all of the five criteria listed is not a person.
More recently, in a revised version of her earlier work, Mary Anne Warren edn has expanded on and refined the characteristics which she believes are central to the concept of personhood, namely:. She explains:. Warren, , Warren, suggests that, in order to demonstrate that a fetus is not a person, all that is required is to claim that a fetus has none of the above six characteristics of personhood.
For some, the personhood argument does little to settle the abortion question. For example, it might be claimed that, even if it is true that a fetus is not a person, it nevertheless has the potential to become one, and therefore it has rights see also Warren There are a number of difficulties with this view. First, the argument tends to presume that what is potential will in fact become actual. In the case of zygotes, however, this is quite improbable.
Second, the argument strongly suggests that it is not the fetus per se that is valued, but rather what it will become Glover : It is difficult to interpret just what kind of moral demand this creates.
As Glover : points out:. If we take the potentiality argument to its logical extreme, we are committed to accepting, absurdly, that contraception, the wasteful ejaculation of sperm, menstruation and celibacy are also morally wrong, since these too will result in future persons being prevented from existing Warren : One answer is that, given our understanding of the nature of moral rights and correlative duties, there is something logically and linguistically odd in ascribing rights to fetuses non-persons , particularly during the pre-sentient stage.
If we were to accept that non-sentient fetuses have moral rights, we would be committed, absurdly, to accepting that all sorts of other non-sentient things have moral rights — including human toenails, strands of hair or pieces of skin. Further, since both stand to die unless the pregnancy is terminated, then surely it is better, morally speaking, that only one life is lost instead of two?
It is difficult to see how anyone could reasonably and conscientiously choose an outcome which would see both the mother and the fetus die. Furthermore, as stated elsewhere in this book, morality does not generally require us to make large personal sacrifices on behalf of another, and thus it would be morally incorrect to suggest that the mother has a duty to sacrifice her life in defence of the fetus. Against this, however, it might still be claimed that the inconveniences and other psychological, physical or social ills caused by an unwanted pregnancy are still not enough to justify killing the fetus and violating its right to life Brody ; Noonan The demand not to kill the fetus becomes even more persuasive when it is considered that there are alternatives available for helping to prevent or alleviate the ills of unwanted pregnancies, such as child welfare and other social security benefits, adoption, counselling, medication, or ectogenesis.
Notwithstanding the ethical and legal concerns raised by ectogenesis, scientists are of the view that successful human ectogenesis will be achieved within the next two decades Abecassis Commentators also foresee that, if achieved, human ectogenesis will radically change the parameters of the conventional abortion debate including rendering it a non-issue Cohen ; Coleman The mother might, for example, contemplate getting pregnant for the sole purpose of growing tissue which can be harvested and transplanted into her brain or pancreas in an attempt to restore her health.
The issue of fetal tissue transplantation has long been the subject of intense debate Engelhardt ; Sandel Court challenges brought by biological fathers against their partners have tended to be viewed with little sympathy from women who historically have been left alone with the burden and hardships of child rearing after the fathers of their children have long abandoned them.
Some even worry that, if the paternity rights debate is allowed to progress to its logical extreme, it could have paved the way for rapists to prevent their victims from having abortions, and to press for access rights after the baby has been born. In the US, one Supreme Court stated that when a father and mother disagree on whether an abortion should go forward:.
As noted in the introduction to this discussion, the abortion issue is extraordinarily complex; it is also extremely political, as some spectacular overseas incidents have shown. The teenager decided to have an abortion upon learning that the fetus she was carrying had a rare brain condition anencephaly and was not expected to live longer than a few days after being born Bowcott : Although abortion was illegal in Ireland at the time and the subject of a constitutional ban, overturned only in May , it was permitted to be performed in cases where the risks to the mother were substantial.
Neither the law nor the constitution allowed abortion to be performed on grounds of fetal abnormality, however, and it was this point that threatened to cause a constitutional crisis. The abortion debate in the US took a dramatic and historic turn in , when an anti-abortion protester shot and killed a doctor during a pro-life demonstration outside a lawful abortion clinic Rohter : 7; see also Hadley According to Robinson of Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, since harassment and violence first began to be levelled at abortion clinics in the early s, there have been literally tens of thousands of incidents directed against abortion clinic personnel.
Although the number of seriously violent crimes against abortion clinics e. It should be noted, however, that this situation is not unique to the US.
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